Manufacturing blindness
By Ran HaCohen, Al-Ahram Weekly on-line 4 - 10 September 200
Israel's military-controlled apparatus keeps the broad public ignorant about occupation realities, writes Ran HaCohen in this reply to Jonathan Cook -- In mid-August, just before the last eruption of violence, Israel offered to return four towns to Palestinian control. Portrayed as a generous gesture, the list of towns could be found all over the media: Qalqilia, Ramallah, Tulkarm, and Jericho. I wonder how many Israelis, if any at all, have noticed the manipulation, unmentioned in any journalistic report I have seen: during the present Intifada, the Israeli army did not occupy Jericho and the town had not been taken out of Palestinian control in the first place.
I couldn't help thinking of this anecdote while reading the brilliant response of Jonathan Cook to my previous column (Al-Ahram Weekly, 21-27 August 2003). "HaCohen is wrong," writes Cook, "to think that Israelis are ignorant of what is being done in their name. They know exactly what happens: their Zionist training simply blinds them to its significance." Cook insists that "Any Israeli [...] has ample opportunity to find out what is really happening to Palestinians [...] not from the now mainly compliant Hebrew media but from eyewitnesses to the actual events."
I am not convinced by Cook's "theory of knowledge", i.e. that in our society eye-witnesses can compete with the credibility and exposure enjoyed by the mass media. First, there may be fewer eye-witnesses to the actual events than Cook suggests: combatant soldiers are always a minority within the military. Second, a soldier usually sees just his small part of the picture; the overall view (land, water, employment, freedom of movement etc.) may well escape him. Third, no eye-witness can convey his story to more than a few dozen friends and relatives back home; even if the story passes on to more remote audiences, it becomes a rumour. Collective consciousness is therefore shaped by the media much more than by any eye-witness. Not without reason are soldiers not allowed to talk to journalists: eye-witness becomes dangerous once it turns into a media item. And as for the Israeli media, Cook and I would probably agree that its designation as "mainly compliant" is an understatement.
Palestinian Power-Struggle is About Visions, Not Just Power
By Ramzy Baroud, Palestine Chronicle 9/5/2003
The buzz in the media about the "power-struggle" between Palestinian Authority President, Yasser Arafat and his Prime Minister, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) is misleading. The issue at stake is not simply the drive for power.
Yes, there is some kind of “power-struggle”, if you will, but this is not your typical Third-World quarrel between traditional and rebellious leaderships. Nor is it simply a scuffle between a leader representing the conventional chain of command and a vibrant new leader.
Both Arafat and Abbas are old, the former educated in Cairo and the latter in Moscow during the Soviet age. Moreover, Arafat is elected, and despite his ups and downs, he is still respected among Palestinians, while Abbas’ popularity stands at 3 percent, equal to a survey’s margin of error.
This is by no means an attempt to cheer for Arafat and taint Abbas. In fact, in a better, pressure-free environment, the appointment of Abbas would have been a step forward in the Palestinian nation’s struggle for a healthy democratic experience.
But putting wishful thinking aside, the pressure is on, if not because of the United States government’s candid attempts to sideline Arafat, because of the continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian cities, over which both Arafat and Abbas are supposedly presiding.
Betrayal at Camp David
By Uri Avnery, Palestine Chronicle 9/6/2003
It was the first day of the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations, after Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem. They took place at Mina House, a hotel rich in history near the Pyramids.
In front of the building, the Egyptians had hoisted the flags of all the Arab countries they had invited (none showed up, of course). On one of the poles the Palestinian flag was fluttering merrily.
I was going up the stairs, when I saw the Chief of the Israeli Security Service coming down in a great hurry. He was a bitter enemy of mine, and therefore I was rather surprised when he addressed me: “Uri, you must help me! What does the PLO flag look like?”
“It’s not the PLO flag,” I corrected him, “It’s the Palestinian national flag.” On a piece of paper, I drew its likeness.
“O my God!” he cried, ”The Egyptians have hoisted this flag!”
He hurried back to the conference hall, and a few minutes later the Egyptians suddenly took down all the flags, including the Palestinian.
This little incident was symbolic of all that happened in the run-up to the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, and especially at the central event – the (first) Camp David summit meeting of September 5, 1978.
On the 25th anniversary of that conference, which takes place this week, secret documents of that period have been published. The most interesting is the list of recommendations prepared by the State Department for President Jimmy Carter on the eve of his departure for Camp David.
False Frontier
By David Landau, Miftah 9/6/2003
Few countries in the world - so said a television newscaster in a surge of patriotism on Monday - would carry out such an exhaustive and painful investigation against itself as Israel has with the Or Commission. Unintentionally, the newscaster seems to have touched on the deep-seated motives, buried in the collective soul, which help to explain the frenzy of self-flagellation and media-hyped masochistic ecstasy that has swept the country since the publication of the commission's findings this week.
On the face of it, the sequence of events borders on the grotesque. In the first days of October 2000, with the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, 13 Arabs (among them one visitor from Gaza) were shot to death in northern Israel. But in those same days, many other Arabs were shot to death in the center and south of the country. Since then, nearly 2,500 Arabs have been shot to death.
For all these, there was no commission; there was no rumbling of the earth; there was no parading of sins in a mock Atonement Day. But the 13 dead in the north have had an 800-page report by an official commission of inquiry, countless newspaper columns, and hours of television coverage, living room debates and erudite commentary devoted to them. All this, without even mentioning the 850 Jews who have been killed in that same intifada, whose deaths also deserve to be probed and investigated.
Root and branch
By Ibrahim Nafie, Al-Ahram Weekly on-line 4 - 10 September 200
I have written dozens of articles on the roadmap. I have appealed to both sides to implement their obligations under this settlement plan. I have recounted Egypt's marathon efforts at mediation in getting the various Palestinian forces to agree to the principle of a truce and I have discussed other matters central to reaching a solution on this track of the Middle East conflict. I have also observed that while Egypt and other Arab parties worked to promote the adoption of a negotiating mechanism capable of leading to a viable peace Israel, supported by ultra right and Zionist forces abroad, remained bent on systematically undermining these very same efforts.
The current fragmentation of the Arab world, the lack of effective coordination among the Arab parties directly concerned with the negotiating process, the US-British occupation of Iraq, venomous talk of the futility of the Arab League -- such factors have combined to create the ideal climate for the Israeli right to fulfil its vision with regards to Palestine and the Middle East. Having accomplished the first phase of the Zionist project -- statehood and territorial acquisition -- Zionist ideologues in Israel and the US are poising themselves for the next phase: regional hegemony. It is for this reason that we must look beyond the immediate chain of cause and effect in order to understand what is happening in Palestine.
International Conference And An Interim State?
By Walid Choucair, Al-Hayat 9/5/2003
The U.S. sticks its head in the sand when it insists on ignoring Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and his important influence on the Palestinian scene. Despite the fact of its awareness of his political, popular and organizational weight within the Palestinian Authority, Fatah and the Palestinian society as a whole.
The same U.S. Secretary Of State Colin Powell who said yesterday that Arafat's words about the death of the Roadmap are of no value and that the U.S. didn't deal with him when it drew the Roadmap, had said not more than two weeks ago that Arafat should help Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas in preserving the truce and in controlling the Palestinian factions that are carrying out suicide operations. The only difference here is that after Powell addressed the requirement to Arafat, the latter responded and announced that he was ready to control these organizations, the White House, thus replied that the Palestinian President is a partner in the problem and not a partner in the solution…
This means, once more, that the parties insisting on adopting the policy that reflects matching whatever Israel wants in the U.S. administration, or rather in the White House, are not giving the Department of State the chance to make any amendment imposed by the objective reality of the adopted system in solving the crisis between Palestinians and Israelis.
Arafat versus Bush
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Al-Ahram Weekly on-line 4 - 10 September 200
Once again, Arafat is proving that he cannot easily be unseated -- After months of being sidelined and forced to adopt a defensive posture, Arafat has gone on the offensive. Following Israel's assassination of senior Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab in retaliation for the Jerusalem suicide bus bombing that killed 21 people, Colin Powell broke the hitherto strict American boycott of the Palestinian leader with a public appeal to Arafat to make the security apparatus still under his control available to his Prime Minister Abu Mazen. But instead of responding to Powell's request, Arafat did just the opposite, tightening his grip on the national security, general intelligence and military intelligence forces under his command in what is seen as a clear message that he is still the leader and that he still retains control of an important card.
Arafat created a new security post, counsellor for Palestinian national security, to which he appointed one of his loyalists, former West Bank security chief Jibril Rajoub. He is also trying to get his nominee, Nasser Youssef, appointed to the post of interior minister, which would make Abu Mazen's security chief Mohamed Dahlan subordinate to him. Arafat is reasserting his primacy in Palestinian politics at a time of acute crisis in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. After reorganising the top echelons of the Palestinian Authority to signal to all concerned that he is still in the saddle and that it will take more than an American-Israeli decision to dislodge him, Arafat called on all Palestinian factions to restore national unity and to reinstate the truce in order to give international efforts to implement the roadmap a chance of success.
Iraq and US Election Seen Sapping Mideast Peace Drive
By Alistair Lyon, Arab News 9/6/2003
LONDON, 6 September 2003 — Now that the peace “road map” has hit a violent dead-end, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is likely to be left largely to its own grim devices while Iraq and next year’s US elections preoccupy the Bush administration.
The United States has squarely blamed the Palestinians for the deadlock in progress on the road map designed to lead to President George W. Bush’s vision of a Palestinian state.
“I don’t want to sugarcoat this,” State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said on Thursday. “The main problem now is terrorism and violence and the Palestinian Authority needs to take hold of that problem if we are to move forward.”
Many Palestinians will take this to mean Washington has no plan to press Israel just as hard on its road map obligations to end settlement activity and violence against Palestinians. “It’s very convenient for the Americans to blame the Palestinians because the road map was not heading anywhere anyway,” said London-based Palestinian analyst Ahmed Khalidi.
He said this was not surprising given Bush’s worries over Iraq and the 2004 presidential election, and the absence of any improvements on the ground for Palestinians under occupation.
Yossi Mekelberg, an Israeli analyst at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in London, said the road map depended on sustained US and international energy and will.
Time to stop the Palestinian suicide bombings
By Khatoun Haidar, Daily Star 9/6/2003
Israeli missile strikes in Gaza, an ugly Palestinian civil war looming and a moribund peace process. These ingredients add up to a bleak future for the Palestinian people as the cycle of violence and retribution in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict becomes increasingly difficult to break.
The intransigence of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, unconditional American support for him and the pathetic hopelessness of the Arab world make me wonder if there is any hope for the Palestinians, no matter what they do. I find myself reluctant at this stage to criticize any of the factions that form the Palestinian resistance, but when the future is so grim, one must look at things as they really are.
According to international law the West Bank and Gaza are occupied land, and people living under occupation have the right to use any means available, including armed struggle, to fight such a circumstance. Hamas and Islamic Jihad are part of the Palestinian national liberation movement. The form of resistance that has become their signature is suicide bombings carried against “soft targets.” However, attacking innocent civilians is not part of legitimate armed struggle and, in my code of ethics, is unjustifiable. Let us also try to evaluate, without prejudice, its value as a war tactic.
Tactics are “the art or skill of employing available forces with an end in view.” When successful, tactics win battles. To win wars, however, they must be part of an overall strategy. A common definition of strategy is “the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological and military forces of a nation, or group of nations, to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war.”
Surviving for what?
By Graham Usher, Al-Ahram Weekly on-line 4 - 10 September 200
Assailed by Israel from without, the PA leadership is self-destructing from within -- History will judge what lessons Israel will take on board from the Or Commission's investigation into the killings of 12 Palestinian citizens of Israel during the "internal Intifada" of October 2000. There is no need for history concerning Israel's policies towards those other 3.2 million Palestinians under its charge in Gaza and the West Bank. These policies are current, military and openly declared as a "new and different chapter" by Israel's Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz.
They consist of severing all contacts with the Palestinian Authority (and therefore all obligations under the roadmap); round-the- clock arrest and search raids in West Bank Palestinian cities and villages; warnings that Yasser Arafat may "soon" have to be banished and Gaza invaded; and, above all, a relentless war against Hamas at "all levels of its leadership".
Since a Hamas suicide bomber killed 21 civilians on a Jerusalem bus last month the Israeli army has killed 15 Palestinians in six "targeted" assassinations in the Gaza Strip. The latest dead were Hamas activists Khader Husari and Munsar Knita, slain by missiles fired by helicopters into a teeming side street in Gaza City on 1 September. Thirty other Palestinians were wounded, some seriously, all of them civilians. Israel says the assassinations will continue "every few hours" until and unless the PA acts against the militias.
Abbas’ Statement
Al-Hayat 9/5/2003
In his declaration before the Legislative Council, Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas didn't mention anything about the "achievements" of his government that the deputies and the citizens weren't aware of. He didn't present a clear analysis of the evolutions related to the Roadmap or "achievements" justifying his demand to increasing his government's prerogatives, especially on the security level, what the Americans and the Israelis are inciting. Abbas and his Security Affairs Minister, Mohamad Dahlan, were received yesterday with hostile yells in front of the Legislative Council reflecting the decline in the popularity of this government and its two eminent personalities, knowing that the Americans and the Israelis have harmed their reputation from their praise.
Abbas was expected to impress his listeners or receive their cheers by presenting his government's "achievements," not because of a self or moral deficiency in it, but because the Roadmap, which insures Israel's security in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with Jerusalem as its capital in 2005, was faced with the most hostile acts from Israel. The U.S. administration was merciful regarding these acts and didn't stop the Sharon government from executing them.
Palestinian President Yasser Arafat was specific in his diagnosis of the state of the Roadmap when he declared, on the eve of Abbas' declaration, that "the Roadmap is dead, but only because of the Israeli military attacks in the past few weeks" and that the American interests in Iraq and the coming presidential elections prevented the implementation of the Roadmap.
|
