Deciphering the hodna
By Azmi Bishara, Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, 10 - 16 July 2003
The Palestinian factions have declared a unilateral cease-fire. But unless the resistance is involved in policymaking, things will get worse -- Talk of a hodna, or truce, has opened the door for various forms of orientalist interpretation masquerading as well-informed opinion throughout the Israeli media. Talk shows are parading experts to discuss the place of hodna in Islamic history and review the battles fought by the Prophet Mohamed. Can anything be more painful than to hear interlocutors peppering their speech with an Arabic word, as if by doing so they automatically acquired an esoteric key to knowledge which the Hebrew or English languages lack? Hodna has risen like a fearsome apparition from the past, a manifestation of a mythical world requiring guided tours to explain it, and interpreters dressed in safari-wear to decipher its codes. What harm can be done by employing the odd local -- a sympathetic minder, a friendly detective -- to help the American protagonist along his way? Better yet, our hero -- in this case, a Western journalist or expert -- may even succeed in freeing the local society from their despotic leaders, like a Hollywood action man who rescues a fair maiden from her fierce oriental captor. The analogies may seem far-fetched, but they are tempting, for reality of late has turned into a farcical combination of racism, male chauvinism, and imperialist perspective. The trip down the hidden linguistic alleys of the hodna has been particularly arduous, and only got worse when one particular commentator introduced fetna to the argument -- a term loosely translatable as sedition. Without batting an eyelid, he casually dropped into the conversation that there will be no "fetna". But then, an Arabic word is always useful to enhance the local colour. Thus hodna has now joined Intifada, which has survived in the Hebrew and English literature while all attempts at its translation simply faded away. In the process, the Intifada was elevated into a special case, differentiated from other uprisings and revolts. It became a unique phenomenon, confined to the Palestinians, and resistant to full comprehension. As a topic, it therefore required a measure of elaboration: it needed to be explained and debated at length. The same thing is now happening with hodna. It is being morphed into an esoteric concept, which historians and linguists are invited to explain. Suddenly, we are no longer talking of a cease- fire -- a concept readily available in English, and which is widely used in reference to the armistice lines of 1949 -- but of something much stranger, much harder to pin down: a hodna. In actual fact, what the Palestinian groups have recently offered is a unilateral cease-fire. It is as simple as that. When the armistice lines were drawn up in 1949, the action was rendered in English by its appropriate name, and no one saw any reason to introduce the Arabic word, hodna, into other languages.

Internal Palestinian Dialogue: The Non-Violence Strategy
By Tawfiq Abu Bakr, Al-Hayat, July 14, 2003
In 1974, Palestinian political thought experienced an upheaval with the endorsement of the establishment of a Palestinian state on part of Palestinian land, which was approved, for the first time, at the twelfth National Council in June of that year. Palestinian masses mobilized in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in a pervasive non-violent movement to support the decision and resist occupation. No large-scale military operations took place from beyond the borders. Instead, the external PLO leadership relied on this popular movement, organizing it within an institutional framework and discovering (albeit too late) that national movements have significant influence on the Israeli public and on the capacity to alter equations. That was the first major political shift in the course of the PLO, which prior to that only believed in armed struggle and military power. The second major shift was caused by the December 1987 Intifada, in which weapons played no role and stones represented mere symbolic violence, and the fight against the devil, according to pilgrimage traditions in Islam that give the stone sacred meaning. In that Intifada, popular activities gained tremendous momentum, providing no reason for Hamas to resort to weapons. There was, despite this, a broad distinction between political powers operating within the framework of the PLO and Islamic factions. The Intifada had two leaderships: A unified national leadership incorporating factions that believe in peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state using non-violence as a method; and a Hamas leadership, with Islamic political factions, within the framework of another leadership. The unified national leadership exerted intense pressure on the PLO leadership "outside" to be politically moderate, sending a memorandum to the meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers (November 1988) demanding unambiguous recognition of UN Security Council Resolution 242, and declaration of a Palestinian state in a push for an historical reconciliation. I was witness to all of this. The National Council approved the demands listed in the memorandum, which I believe is the second shift in the course of Palestinian political thought.

The Age of Absolute Injustice
By MIFTAH, July 13, 2003
To the dismay of many war crimes victims worldwide, Belgium has abandoned its 1993 law, which gave Belgian courts the authority to try war crimes cases, regardless of where they were committed. The new Belgian cabinet, sworn in on Saturday, has completely scraped the controversial law, indirectly succumbing to US pressure and threats by US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to suspend official US visits to Belgium, and US funding of NATO’s new headquarters. In Brussels, Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, stated that his new government has decided to completely abandon the law, as it “…angered the United States.” It was also decided that all cases of war crimes, except those involving Belgian nationals, would be dropped. Apparently, in the past 24 hours, the issue has been muddled up with claims and counter claims that the Belgians decided to abolish the law in order to prevent certain individuals from exploiting it for their own interest, and to target other individuals. Belgian Foreign Minister, Louis Michel, himself under heavy scrutiny by the law due to his unlawful involvement in weapons smuggling to Nepal, said "…this [the 1993 law] was abused by some people who wanted to damage other people, leaders and partners. Those who forced us to change the law are those who abused the law." Other desperate justifications, and face-saving attempts, are bound to emerge in the coming days, weeks, and months until the issue is rendered outdated and unworthy of further attention, let alone of unnecessary/unwanted confrontation with the US.

National House of Waffles
By Maureen Dowd, New York Times, July 13, 2003
More and more, with Bush administration pronouncements about the Iraq war, it depends on what the meaning of the word "is" is. W. built his political identity on the idea that he was not Bill Clinton. He didn't parse words or prevaricate. He was the Texas straight shooter. So why is he now presiding over a completely Clintonian environment, turning the White House into a Waffle House, where truth is camouflaged by word games and responsibility is obscured by shell games? The president and Condi Rice can shuffle the shells and blame George Tenet, but it smells of mendacity. Mr. Clinton indulged in casuistry to hide personal weakness. The Bush team indulges in casuistry to perpetuate its image of political steel. Dissembling over peccadillos is pathetic. Dissembling over pre-emptive strikes is pathological, given over 200 Americans dead and 1,000 wounded in Iraq, and untold numbers of dead Iraqis. Our troops are in "a shooting gallery," as Teddy Kennedy put it, and our spy agencies warn that we are on the cusp of a new round of attacks by Saddam snipers. Why does it always come to this in Washington? The people who ascend to power on the promise of doing things differently end up making the same unforced errors their predecessors did. Out of office, the Bush crowd mocked the Clinton propensity for stonewalling; in office, they have stonewalled the 9/11 families on the events that preceded the attacks, and the American public on how — and why — they maneuvered the nation into the Iraqi war. Their defensive crouch and obsession with secrecy are positively Nixonian. (But instead of John Dean and an aggressive media, they have Howard Dean and a cowed media.) In a hole, the president should have done some plain speaking: "The information I gave you in the State of the Union about Iraq seeking nuclear material from Africa has been revealed to be false. I'm deeply angry and I'm going to get to the bottom of this." But of course he couldn't say that. He would be like Sheriff Bart in "Blazing Saddles," holding the gun to his own head and saying, "Nobody move or POTUS gets it." The Bush administration has known all along that the evidence of the imminent threat of Saddam's weapons and the Al Qaeda connections were pumped up. They were manning the air hose.

Safieh's letter to Prime Minister Blair
By Palestinian General Delegate to the UK Afif Safieh, MIFTAH, July 13, 2003
To: The Rt Hon Tony Blair M.P. Prime Minister 10, Downing Street London, London, 11 July, 2003. Dear Prime Minister: I am writing to you, Prime Minister, a few days before you receive in Downing Street Israeli Prime Minister Sharon to express some grave worries I have concerning the implementation of the Road Map, a document in whose adoption and publication you have played a deservedly recognized and significant role. Mr. Sharon might want to capitalize internationally on his reluctant verbal acceptance of the Road Map while, on the ground, the situation leaves, alas, much to be desired. The major reason why the Road Map was welcomed in Arab and Palestinian circles was the involvement and the commitment of the international community through the Quartet and the clarity of their expectations, of both sides, who were called upon to undertake precise measures simultaneously and mutually. It seems to me that the last weeks, on the Israeli side, were far from convincing. Prime Minister Sharon should not be allowed to drag the peace process into the familiar path of the previous oriental bazaar during which successive Israeli governments thought they could get away with setting the ceiling of the possible and the permissible as well as dictating the pace of progress. I believe, Prime Minister, that your discussions with Mr. Sharon can help pre-empt and prevent a predictable impasse if no external stimulus is injected. The peace process will be again in your debt, Sir, if you were to raise the following issues: 1- The Road map demands that Israel abandons its policy of repeated incursions in Palestinian territories and its practice of targeted killings. Alas, we have witnessed incursions, assassinations with "collateral damage" and massive arrests. 2- The Road map demands that Israel dismantles all the settlements/outposts, authorized and unauthorized, built since March 2001. The Americans have informed the Israeli side that their intelligence-gathering shows 94 such outposts. The Israeli government started, timidly, dismantling less than 10 uninhabited outposts, and have allowed several new ones to crop up. More dangerously, settlement expansion is underway in occupied East Jerusalem in the Beit Iksa and Abu Dis neighbourhoods....

When killing becomes routine
By Gideon Levy, Haaretz, July 13, 2003
At the beginning of June, Nabil Jirdath, 48, a clothing merchant and the father of eight, drove from his store in Jenin to his home in the village of Silath al-Harthiya. With him in the car were seven of his family members, including children. Suddenly the car came under light-arms fire from a tank that was stationed on the main road. Jirdath was critically wounded and died a few days later. It's possible that the soldiers wanted to frighten the occupants of the car, as the driver, for fear of the tank, had turned on to a bypass dirt road. And so the soldiers opened fire at the vehicle from long range. The result was an appallingly unnecessary death, which, as in many other cases, was of no interest to the Israeli public. However, the lack of interest shown in the event by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) this time assumed a horrific character: it turned out that the IDF Spokesperson's Office had no knowledge of the incident. Someone is killed but no investigation is made and no record is kept of the event anywhere - as though an animal was the victim. Is it possible that the soldiers in the tank didn't even bother reporting to their superiors that they had killed someone? Another week went by after the IDF Spokesperson promised to look into the matter, and MK Isaac Herzog (Labor) submitted a motion for agenda in the Knesset about the incident. The defense establishment again stated that it knew nothing about the event. The deputy defense minister asked for a week's extension to clarify the matter. About a month has gone by since the incident, but no one has any idea why the soldiers killed Nabil Jirdath.

Wish you weren't here
By Gary Younge, The Guardian, July 14, 2003
America just loves immigration - it's immigrants who aren't popular. As Muslims are now finding out  -- Ansar Mahmood wanted to give his family, back in Pakistan, an impression of his new life in Hudson, New York. So in between pizza deliveries he drove to Hudson's highest point to get a good view of the mountains and asked one of two guards on duty to take his picture with the sunset as a backdrop. Also in the frame was Hudson's water treatment plant. It was October 2001, at the height of the anthrax scare. While one guard took his picture the other phoned the police. By the time Mahmood got back to Domino's, where he worked, the police were waiting for him. A few days later tests on the water proved clear and checks showed all his papers were in order. But the police had also discovered that he had paid the first month's rent and car insurance for a Pakistani couple who were in the country illegally. Mahmood told the Washington Post he had no idea that their immigration status was in question. He pleaded guilty to harbouring illegal immigrants - a charge usually reserved for smugglers at the border - and is now in federal detention awaiting deportation. It's a long way from a snapshot of dusk on the Hudson, but Mahmood's fate is a more accurate impression of life for many Musilm immigrants in America right now than any photo he might have sent back home. Since September 11, they have been the principal casualties of the erosion of civil rights in America. Their treatment not only highlights the distortions in America's self-image as a nation always ready to embrace immigrants, but also serves as a metaphor for the war on terror - callous and futile, high in human costs and low in its impact on terrorism. Some, like Mahmood, have been in the wrong place at the wrong time. Others have been the victims of a systematic trawl as men without a green card from Arab and predominantly Muslim countries regarded as potential sources of terrorism have had to register, and then be fingerprinted and photographed by the immigration service.

Trade without consent: choosing between free trade and democracy in Jordan
By Pete W. Moore, Daily Star, July 14, 2003
Listen carefully to US trade officials today and you will realize they sound a lot like first generation Arab-Americans admonishing their culturally aloof grandchildren: “For centuries, the Middle East was the world’s pre-eminent bazaar, a region renowned for commercial prowess. In the United States, 3 million Arab immigrants have evidenced an impressive talent for commerce and education.” So spoke US trade representative Robert Zoellick at the recent World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting in Jordan. The stereotype aside, this has not always been the case for American policy. In the 1950s and 1960s, American intelligence and foreign policy officials regarded the Arab private sector with contempt. Tied to the old European colonialists, weak in the face of communist aggression and simply untrustworthy, Arab entrepreneurs were sidelined by American officials in favor of young, military officers deemed more reliable. With those distant misperceptions left behind, the Arab private sector is now viewed as the low-cost domestic force that will finally solve America’s problems in the Middle East. In US President George W. Bush’s words, all that is required is to “let go of the bitterness, hatred and violence, and get on with the serious work of economic development.” Arguably, Jordan is the most important test case for Washington’s plans to remake the Middle East through free trade and market reform. While there is little debate that productive growth and job creation are urgent goals for all countries in the region, there is growing criticism about how these goals are pursued and mounting evidence about their tradeoffs in Jordan. Two recent programs, the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the Middle East Free Trade Area, seek to provide targeted assistance to the private sector and increased trade opportunities respectively as the mechanisms to defeat anti-American radicalism, secure Arab-Israeli peace and deliver sustainable growth. Jordan figures prominently in each policy, having concluded a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, opened Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) in 1997 and signed a free-trade deal with the US in 2000. Integral to the Oslo peace process was this American logic: Free trade and increased Arab-Israeli business links strengthen the private sector, a natural supporter of peace and a bulwark against radicalism. In 1995, American officials began encouraging meetings, multilateral exchanges and joint business ventures among Arabs and Israelis. To deepen these exchanges, American officials offered the QIZ program. The program specifies zones in Jordan ­ 12 to date ­ in which manufacturers who locate there can export ­ tariff and tax free ­ to the US market by meeting precise rules of origin. The rules specify that a minimum of 35 percent of the exported good must be composed of local content: 11.7 percent of the local content must be Jordanian, 7-8 percent must be from Israel and the remainder can come from any combination of the US, Jordan, Israel, or the West Bank/Gaza.