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Who
in Israel knows or cares?
By Amira Hass, Haaretz, June 18, 2003
Two days before the attempt on the life of Abdel Aziz Rantisi, three Palestinian
gunmen killed four Israeli soldiers at a military outpost in the Erez industrial
zone of the Gaza Strip. During the gun battle, the three armed Palestinians were
also killed, while responsibility for the operation was claimed by three organizations
- Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah. Some say there was a direct causal relationship
between the attack on the outpost and the decision to assassinate the senior Hamas
leader, when it was obvious to all that this would open a new round of vengeance
killings. The collective pain in Israel over the death in battle of soldiers cannot
be less than the pain from the murder of civilians killed in terror attacks. But
from comments made by politicians after the battle, from the formulations that
appeared in the Israeli press, from the immediate acts of demolition by the Israel
Defense Forces in northern Gaza that disrupted the little that remained undisrupted
in the lives of thousands of residents of Beit Hanun, and from the attempted assassination,
it's clear that the killing of three soldiers inside a military position, in an
area that Israel conquered in 1967, is considered by Israelis as purely an act
of terror. An attack on a military post is defined as a terror attack, and the
attackers are deemed terrorists - the exact same terms used to describe the suicide
bombing in Jerusalem. This is the prevailing Israeli view: Israeli soldiers are
always involved in "combat," even when they bomb a refugee camp and kill children.
Palestinians are always terrorists, even when they face a tank, even when their
targets are Israeli soldiers in an Israeli army base, even when one of the missions
of that base is to make sure that Jews are allowed to settle without obstruction
in areas conquered by Israel in 1967. Obviously, the Israelis can't share the
feelings of Palestinian pride about the three young men, who never went through
any kind of formal military training and knew they had little chance of surviving
the attack, and who managed to infiltrate an area surrounded by walls, barbed
wire and observations posts, and to attack a military target. But when there's
no distinction made between an operation that targets soldiers and one that targets
civilians, and when a military attack is defined as a terror attack, it is, in
effect, the same logic that the Palestinians use when they say that in their resistance
against their occupation, attacks on civilians are as legitimate as attacks on
soldiers. The argument - if there's a difference or not - is constantly underway
in the Palestinian public. A tiny minority believes there's a moral injunction
against harming civilians. A larger minority argues that tactical reasons should
prevent attacks on civilians inside the Green Line. But they find it difficult
to respond to the counter-arguments: The IDF doesn't mind killing civilians -
and civilians are the majority of Palestinians who are being killed. There's no
difference between a one-ton bomb dropped on a residential building, a tank shell,
or a human bomb: Every civilian was or will be a soldier. They kill our mothers,
too.
Dereliction
of Duty
By Paul Krugman, New York Times, June 17, 2003
Last Thursday a House subcommittee met to finalize next year's homeland security
appropriation. The ranking Democrat announced that he would introduce an amendment
adding roughly $1 billion for areas like port security and border security that,
according to just about every expert, have been severely neglected since Sept.
11. He proposed to pay for the additions by slightly scaling back tax cuts for
people making more than $1 million per year. The subcommittee's chairman promptly
closed the meeting to the public, citing national security — though no classified
material was under discussion. And the bill that emerged from the closed meeting
did not contain the extra funding. It was a perfect symbol of the reality of the
Bush administration's "war on terror." Behind the rhetoric — and behind
the veil of secrecy, invoked in the name of national security but actually used
to prevent public scrutiny — lies a pattern of neglect, of refusal to take
crucial actions to protect us from terrorists. Actual counterterrorism, it seems,
doesn't fit the administration's agenda. Yesterday The Washington Post printed
an interview with Rand Beers, a top White House counterterrorism adviser who resigned
in March. "They're making us less secure, not more secure," he said of the Bush
administration. "As an insider, I saw the things that weren't being done." Among
the problem areas he cited were homeland security, where he says the administration
has "only a rhetorical policy"; failure to press Saudi Arabia (the home of most
of the Sept. 11 terrorists) to take action; and, of course, the way we allowed
Afghanistan to relapse into chaos. Some of this pattern of neglect involves penny-pinching.
Back in February, even George W. Bush in effect admitted that not enough money
had been allocated to domestic security — though (to the fury of Republican
legislators) he blamed Congress. Yet according to Fred Kaplan in Slate, the administration's
latest budget proposal for homeland security actually contains less money than
was spent last year. Meanwhile, urgent priorities remain unmet. For example, port
security, identified as a top concern from the very beginning, has so far received
only one-tenth as much money as the Coast Guard says is needed....
Stick
to the nuclear point on Iran
Editorial, Financial Times, June 17, 2003
International pressure on Iran to come clean about its alleged clandestine nuclear
programme may be about to produce some results. The International Atomic Energy
Agency is examining Tehran's nuclear activities this week at its board meeting
in Vienna, amid signs that the the US - which labelled Iran a charter member of
the "axis of evil" along with Iraq and North Korea - is curbing its instinct to
bring the issue to the boil and trying instead to build a broader diplomatic front.
That, for now, is clearly the best way to approach the problem. Iran, for its
part, is signalling that it may decide "positively" on the IAEA's demand that
it sign an additional protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This would
allow unannounced and intrusive inspections at any declared or suspect site, and
considerably strengthen NPT safeguards. If Iran were responding purely to pressure
from the "Great Satan", its reaction would be different. But, unlike with Iraq,
the US has the European Union and Russia firmly in its camp. EU foreign ministers
have called on Tehran to accept tougher IAEA inspections "urgently and unconditionally".
Brussels has leverage, since Iran is keen to secure a trade and co-operation agreement
with the EU. Tehran is also feeling increasingly nervous about becoming encircled
by the US after the fall of Afghanistan and Iraq, which has increased the diplomatic
value of the policy of engagement with Iran pursued by the EU and its member states.
Russia has leverage too. It is helping Iran build nuclear energy plants at Bushehr
in the south of the country, but is now threatening not to supply nuclear fuel
unless Tehran satisfactorily answers a host of IAEA questions about weapons-grade
nuclear material and signs the additional protocol. This degree of international
cohesion may not last indefinitely. But it would be unwise for Washington to try
to force an early IAEA decision to declare Iran in breach of the NPT, triggering
a referral to the UN Security Council. The IAEA board would probably split; the
Council almost certainly would.
Poland
has more to offer Iraq than troops
By Abbey Innes, Financial Times, June 16, 2003
When the Bush administration gave Poland's military an important role in stabilising
postwar Iraq its intention was no doubt partly to reward one of America's most
loyal allies from "New Europe". But there is another reason that Poland and, for
that matter, other eastern European countries should help to stabilise and rebuild
an unstable country ravaged by a cruel autocracy: they have the experience. Iraq
is clearly not eastern Europe in 1989. American forces are still engaged in combat
operations in central Iraq. Elsewhere, the occupiers face enormous difficulties
in establishing order. In contrast, the demise of east European communism was
mostly peaceful. Even after the violent Romanian revolution the ministry buildings
were still standing and civil servants showed up for work. In Iraq, the ministries
are bombed-out shells. The US-UK coalition thought it could decapitate a regime.
It also, as is now clear, demolished a state. But there are similarities. Ba'athism
was modelled on Stalinism. There are many Polish, Czech, Hungarian, Romanian and
Serb reformers and former dissidents who in the past 14 years have constructed
democratic government from a repressive state and a poisoned bureaucracy. These
reformers have learnt from their mistakes, two of which, we should note, were
underestimating the importance of legitimacy and giving rapid economic reform
priority over legal and judicial order. In eastern Europe the new dissident governments
operated with small clusters of hand-picked, effective and trusted officials.
They would not be at a loss in Iraq and might even see the absence of old guard
bureaucracy as an advantage. European anti-communists screened their security
forces, reconstructed their police and military and started party politics - practically
from nothing. Their experience should be brought to bear. The power vacuum in
Baghdad is generating dangerous instability. More important than ethno-religious
tension - there is a widespread tendency in the west to see fundamentalism in
every open religious expression in the Middle East - is the inevitable mutual
distrust that follows the collapse of a totalitarian regime. Iraqis fear the old
guard may return: Saddam Hussein is still alive; Ba'ath party officials are being
called back into public posts; the secret police, like the Securitate in post-Ceausescu
Romania, linger.
Dark
Star Chambers
By Elaine Cassel, CounterPunch, June 18, 2003
Secret Trials, Nameless Defendents, Veiled Threats to Defense Lawyers -- For those
of you hoping the federal courts will save you from the abuses of freedom foisted
upon you by the Congress who brought us the USA Patriot Act and Bush, Rumsfeld,
and Ashcroft, who brought us the "war on terror," I have bad news to report. Yet
another federal appeals court has slammed the door on public interest groups trying
to stem the power of the government to detain, arrest, try, and deport people
in secret. Yes, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia said that
all those nameless and faceless detainees who were rounded up by Ashcroft and
his henchmen after 9/11, who were abused by the government as reported by the
DOJ Inspector General last week, they all have the right to privacy! Now you and
I don't have the right to privacy, common ordinary people charged with anything
from jaywalking to murder, no siree, we have no right to privacy. Anyone can walk
into any courthouse and get our criminal records. But so-called "terrorists" (I
mean, that is why they were rounded up, wasn't it?) hell, they have privacy! Apparently,
that irony was lost on the two who masqueraded as judges. And, just in case you
don't buy the privacy argument, they said they must defer to the President in
time of "war." Yes, that perpetual war that will never end. That war on evil,
that war on terror. Whatever Bush and Ashcroft want from the courts, they will
get. Judge Tatel wrote a stinging dissent, accusing his colleagues (one appointed
by Reagan, on by George the First) of totally abdicating their role as protectors
of the law. What, he said? You say the Freedom of Information Act falls when the
President claims national seucirty? And you are not even going to look at the
claim and see if it is legitimate?
Theater
of Deception
By Sam Hamod, CounterPunch, June 18, 2003
Bush, Sharon and Abbas -- George W. Bush, it appears is an adept thespian. Look
at the way he kept telling the world that he was "doing all I can not to go to
war with Iraq"--when in fact, he'd made the decision months earlier to definitely
go to war against Iraq. We now have the famous theatre of the Aqaba Summit. Here
was GW, Ariel and Mahmoud Abbas--all smiling, shaking hands, making promises--even
promises Mahmoud should never have made just to please GW and Sharon. But it now
appears that Ariel and GW had their own plan that Mahmoud was not privy to--that
Aqaba was pure theatre of the absurd for GW had told Ariel, go ahead, kill all
the Hamas group and let's get rid of them once and for all. GW made a light protest
when Sharon made his bold announcement, but within 24 hours, GW made clear that
Sharon was right to go after all those "terrorists" who were trying to fight for
their homes, land and families--in the same way GW is sure that those Iraqis who
are resisting his "liberation" (aka occupation) are "Saddam loyalists" (not Iraqis),
and anyone else who doesn't believe in and follow GW is nothing but a trouble
maker who should be "punished" (as he told France, Germany and Turkey). So now
the theatricality is over with, GW's mask is off, he is on the stage of the world
embracing Ariel Sharon's dastardly actions. Any hope for this phony "roadmap"
is gone, and the executioner seen is Sharon, but the one behind Sharon, the one
who could stop him, but who instead supports him, is the real mover--GW Bush,
or own little Georgie boy. When Sharon made his famous speech to the Knesset last
week, he stated, "We must rid ourselves of Hamas if there is to be peace. We shall
hunt them down until all these terrorists are killed." At first, GW made a comment,
"This is not helpful." But within 24 hours, he reversed himself and said he agreed
with his hero, Sharon, and wished him Godspeed in is mission to kill the members
of Hamas. It defies logic to think then of Bush as an honest broker, but it allows
me and several other friends, some of whom are people who have abandoned Israel
is a fraudulent dream, to believe that it was all staged so that Bush could keep
his promsie of a "roadmap" to Blair, Straw, the EU and the Arab and Muslims "friendly
nations" as he had promised; after the staging, Sharon was once again, as he has
been for the past two years, let on the loose to go on another rampage of killing
in Palestine in the name of "security." It gets to be a tired song, a repetitious
lie that even children can see through, though not the U.S. media!??
Illuminating
Thomas Friedman
By M. Shahid Alam, Dissident Voice, June 18, 2003
A webpage on Thomas Friedman, maintained by Farrar, Straux & Giroux, declares
that as the foreign affairs columnist for the New York Times (NYT), he is in a
“unique position to interpret the world for American readers. Twice a week,
Friedman’s commentary provides the most trenchant, pithy, and illuminating
perspective in journalism.” My quarrel is not with why Friedman is in “a
unique position to interpret the world for American readers.” That is plain
enough: he writes for NYT, arguably the world’s most influential newspaper.
But does he provide “the most trenchant, pithy and illuminating perspective”
on foreign affairs, on Islam and the Middle East? I have the greatest difficulty
with the third adjective. What does his commentary best illuminate: his subject
or the biases that he brings to his commentary? Consider his column, “The
Reality Principle,” from June 15, 2003. With a quote from an Israeli political
theorist, Yaron Ezrahi, he argues that only the United States, “an external
force,” can rescue the Israelis and Palestinians from their self-destructive
war against each other. United States of America is the “only reality principle.”
Only United States can save the day “with its influence, its wisdom and,
if necessary, its troops.” How illuminating is this? Is United States altogether
“an external force” in its dealings with Israel? This is not a subject
that any politician or mainstream columnist, concerned for his or her career,
can safely bring into the public discourse. It is much safer to take the position
that Israel is a client state of the United States, a strategic asset that polices
America’s friends and foes alike in the oil-rich Middle East. This is also
the premise behind Friedman’s description of United States as the
“only reality principle” in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.
This notion that Israel merely serves US interests is insupportable. At the least,
it ignores three refractory facts. First, if US policy towards Israel is rooted
in its national interest, it would be difficult to account for the vigorous activities
of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—one of two most
powerful political lobbies in the United States—dedicated to ensuring that
the United States remains firmly committed to maintaining Israeli hegemony in
the Middle East. Why would American Jewry engage in such a monumentally wasteful
exercise? Second, there is the curious fact that United States was deeply concerned,
during the two Gulf Wars, to keep its strategic asset out of the war. Third, on
the rare occasion when a US President has opposed an official Israeli position,
even when this was a mild rebuke, he has run into massive opposition from both
parties in the Congress.
Wanted
Men-by Israel for Elimination, by Palestine for National Survival
By Samah Jabr, Palestine Media Center/Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,
June 18, 2003
I was in the staircase of a public building at a very early hour in the morning
when a well-built, barefoot young man accosted me, club in hand. He was not any
less astonished to see me than I was to see him. Unlike me, however, who was paralyzed
with fear, he soon heaved a sigh of relief. The young man quickly apologized and
disappeared before I could fully grasp what had happened. Not long after that
encounter he sent emissaries to inform me that he is one of the wanted Palestinians
whose names appear on the "death lists" that are constantly being issued by the
Israeli government. When he heard my footsteps he became terrified, and that was
why he had raised his club at me. This unusual encounter brought home to me the
reality of the wanted Palestinian political activists and fighters whom the iron
fist of the occupation is eager to crush. Living with virtually no food, in crippling
cold with little clothing, these people are constantly in the shadow of death.
Many of their friends and comrades have been assassinated and many live in dread,
anticipating death at any moment. They hide in caves, old buildings and public
places, not knowing where to go or whom to trust. Israel has a long history of
extra judicial killings, a policy in direct and blatant violation of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. It is being implemented, moreover, with complete disregard
for the risks it poses to the lives of innocent civilian bystanders. The ultimate
motive for this policy seems not to be the mere killing of Palestinian activists-although
hundreds have been assassinated-but rather the "re-education" and intimidation
of the entire nation. The reality of occupation has changed the interests and
life style of many of our brave, altruistic and responsible young men. Resistance
has become their priority and, for many, liberation is the ultimate goal in life.
Instead of being wanted for jobs, for dates, for social and cultural activities,
they are "wanted" as objects of assassination or endless imprisonment in the springtime
of their lives. They behold their blood and coffins wherever they go, and live
with unbearable distrust of others. Wherever they turn they face danger. Parted
from their families and wives, suffering hunger, cold, and homelessness, they
never know in which car, or phone booth, or surroundings, or from what Apache
helicopter gunship, ambush, or sniper's fire they will meet their death.
The
Aqaba summit: Palestinian clarity versus Israeli vagueness
Editorial, Daily Star, June 17, 2003
Each political agenda has its own logic, which means war, reconciliation and peace
also have their own. Each of the four leaders present at the Aqaba summit, which
took place on the eve of the 36th anniversary of the June war that went unmentioned,
delivered his own speech. Two of the speeches, those of US President George W.
Bush, and the host, Jordan’s King Abdullah II, concentrated on their vision
of a two-state solution, and the bright future that this scenario promises. Those
of the two protagonists, Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, concentrated, as was expected of them, on the “road
map” and the happy outcome it would eventually lead to. The manners in which
each of the two premiers expressed their commitments to the road map, however,
were diametrically opposed. While the Abbas speech was clear in expressing his
commitment to it, Sharon’s was shrouded in such vagueness that the expression
of any commitment was almost entirely lost. It appears that the Israeli premier
saw in the lack of clarity a strategy that has a double benefit: one relating
to the internal Israeli scene and the other to any future negotiations with the
Palestinians. On the other hand, Abu Mazen saw the benefit of total clarity and
the unequivocal acceptance of the terms demanded by the United States and its
partners in the “Quartet” who formulated the road map, the shortest
of roads to a Palestinian state. Just as every strategy has its specific requirements
and political agenda, and every agenda has its own logic, the speech of the Palestinian
prime minister was based on two premises: reciprocity in the application of the
road map and readiness for negotiations. It seems however, that the next round
will be tough on both sides given their very opposing logic clarity at one
end, which demonstrates a willingness to reach a solution, and vagueness on the
other, which demonstrates a tendency toward maneuvering on both the implementation
and negotiation levels. That situation begs the following question: What are the
reasons behind the choice of strategies by each side, given the long and bloody
conflict that exists between them?
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