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Has
Sharon set a trap for Bush?
By Henry Siegman, International Herald Tribune, June 3, 2003
NEW YORK President George W. Bush's summit meeting Wednesday with Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon of Israel and the Palestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas, is unexpected
and extraordinary. The hope it generates for progress in the implementation of
the American-back peace plan known as the road map could not have been imagined
just days ago. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to view Sharon's and Abbas's
acceptance of the road map without a large dose of skepticism. In the case of
Abbas, that skepticism has less to do with his intentions than with his ability
to implement the road map's requirements, particularly the demand that he put
an end to terrorism. Abbas must contend with the likely obstructionism of Yasser
Arafat and with the sorry state of Palestinian security forces, destroyed by Israel.
In Sharon's case, the skepticism has nothing to do with his ability to deliver
on the road map's demands, which he unquestionably can, but with his intentions.
Since becoming prime minister in February 2001, Sharon has accepted every peace
initiative, including the Oslo accords, the Mitchell Commission proposals and
the Tenet guidelines, and yet managed to torpedo each with "reservations" and
"conditions." If anything, the reservations Sharon has attached to his acceptance
of the road map are far more destructive than the conditions that enabled him
to defeat previous peace initiatives while skillfully avoiding blame for doing
so. Skepticism about Sharon's acceptance of the road map is also warranted by
reports in the Israeli press about "facts on the ground" being established every
day that are wildly inconsistent with Sharon's new conviction that Israel cannot
continue its occupation of 3.5 million Palestinians. According to the Israeli
journalist Amira Haas, writing in Ha'aretz, these facts on the ground include
a new separation wall that is destroying thousands of acres of the most productive
Palestinian orchards and farmlands critical to the economy of a new Palestinian
state and enclosing Palestinian villages and the entire city of Qalqilya. Israel
has also built security fences around settlements, security roads and bypass roads
that continue to cut off the Palestinian villages from each other and the villages
from their land, and has expanded settlements to half the total area of the West
Bank. These facts may already have determined that the "state" that Sharon is
willing to accept, and that has so deeply scandalized rightist opinion in Israel,
will be comprised of three enclaves within the West Bank (not counting the fourth
enclave in Gaza) cut off from one another, with no direct outlet to neighboring
Arab countries, much less to the rest of the world.
"A
Crusade Without Crusaders"
By Anthony Gancarski, CounterPunch, June 2, 2003
Anti-Imperialism, Then and Now -- Fred H. Harrington is a forgotten name to many,
though there was a time when he was a big name in American letters. His academic
specialty was American diplomatic history, which he taught at University of Wisconsin
before becoming that school's president in 1962. His writings, including his 1935
MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW essay "The Anti-Imperialists: Too Few, Too
Feeble", shaped men such as William A. Williams and others who comprised the "Wisconsin
School" of diplomatic history. Why does a 1935 discussion of those who opposed
US Imperialism between 1898 and 2000 matter today? Because, as I type this, plans
are being made for US military action throughout the world. Perhaps because those
plans are lower-profile than the run-up to the recent liberation, the masses aren't
thronged in the streets, protesting the Pentagon's systemic destruction of strategically-positioned,
mineral-rich cultures. The danger in protesting the Iraqi war as if it were a
singular action cannot be understated. Even if the invasion of Iraq had been "stopped"
-- neglected is the contention that the 1991 hostilities had never actually ended
-- what really would have changed in the Pentagon? We'd still have Rumsfeld spinning
some delightfully dadaist swill about "the unknowable", and there would still
be "total information awareness", and Washington would still be leveraging itself
out to support its military-socialism habit. They would still, like needle junkies,
search for veins to tap and rationales to support their actions. And we who hate
their wars and their fatuous rationales, in all likelihood, would fare no better
than those who opposed aggression upon Spanish holdings. As Harrington asserts,
"in approaching the anti-imperialist movement, it is well to bear in mind that
it was based almost exclusively on grounds of abstract political principle. The
anti-imperialists did not oppose colonial expansion for commercial, religious,
or constitutional" reasons, but because they felt "expansion" ran counter to the
principles in which the United States government finds its rhetorical ballast,
or "legitimacy". Government by, for, and about the people, in other words. With
the advantage of hindsight, it can be argued that the more internationalist anti-war
protesters in the most recent case would've been better served by recycling the
words and ideas of William Jennings Bryan, who saw aggression against Spain as
an attempt to destroy "that self-evident truth that governments derive their just
powers, not from superior force, but from the consent of the governed." Or Grover
Cleveland, some guy in the White House between Lincoln and FDR, who likened colonial
aggrandizement to the abandonment of old landmarks. History has proven right those
who saw aggression against Spain as a prelude to "perpetual war for perpetual
peace" [to borrow a fashionable phrase.] At this point, the military is ensconced
in public life to a degree unimaginable to those whose "presidents" aren't former
generals. One of the greater utilities of Harrington's essay is how it outlines
the broad spectrum of opposition to the war, united in defense of the twained
fates of anti-interventionism and national sovereignty. Andrew Carnegie opposed
the wars, as did leaders of domestic agricultural concerns that would be threatened
by cheap Filipino imports. And, as Harrington puts it, "the political elements
represented in the movement fall into four distinct groups -- the independents,
the Gold democrats, the Bryan Democrats, and the regular Republicans," including
former President Harrison.
The
Altalena Affair
By Uri Avnery, CounterPunch, June 2, 2003
The Sacred Cannon -- Good advice to Abu-Mazen: Keep clear of Altalena! He
is going to get tired of the sound of this name in the near future. Every Israeli
he meets on the way to Aqaba and back will demand that he do to Hamas what Ben-Gurion
did to this ship. But this will be a treacherous request. A short analysis will
show why. On the eve of the founding of the State of Israel, there were three
armed Jewish organizations in Palestine. In private conversations, Israeli security
experts compare the present Palestinian organization to these. The largest was
the "Hagana" ("Defense"), which was a semi-official and semi-clandestine militia
of the Zionist leadership. It can be compared to the Fatah (Tanzim). The second
was the right-wing nationalist "National Military Organization" (for short, "Irgun")
of Menahem Begin. It split in the 30s from the Hagana and conducted bloody actions
against the Arabs and the British occupation forces. It can be compared to the
military wing of Hamas. Even more extreme were the "Fighters for the Freedom of
Israel", commonly known as the "Stern Gang" (after its founder, who was killed
by the British police.) It split from the Irgun in 1940, after that organization
had consented to a "armistice" with the British at the outbreak of World War II.
There is some similarity between the Sternists and Islamic Jihad. The elected
Zionist leadership under David Ben-Gurion detested the two "dissident" groups.
First, because they prevented it from conducting the policy it considered right.
Every time a compromise with the British authorities was under discussion, they
undertook some spectacular action against the British, such as the blowing up
of the British headquarters in the King David hotel, the murder of Lord Moyne
or the hanging of two British sergeants. Second, the dissidents threatened the
leadership's authority. Third, the leadership was leftist, while the Irgun was
on the extreme right. (The ideology of the Sternists is harder to define.) Ben-Gurion
and his colleagues tried everything. At the end of 1944 they even started an operation
code-named "Saison" (hunting season). Hagana men were sent to kidnap Irgun members
on the streets and at home and to hand them over to the British police, which
interrogated them under torture and put them in prison. It was Menahem Begin,
the Irgun commander, who prevented a bloody civil war. He did not shrink from
shedding Arab and British blood, but shedding Jewish blood was abhorrent to him.
He forbade his men from reacting, and even during the worst days of the Saison,
Irgun members did not defend themselves. His rival, Stern leader Nathan Yellin-Mor,
gave different orders. As he told me years later: "I had a clandestine meeting
with the Hagana leader, Eliyahu Golomb. I put my revolver in front of me on the
table and said: Every one of us will open fire on whoever tries to kidnap us."
The Hagana wisely decided not to act against his group.
The
Road Map -- a matter of time
By Hasan Abu Nimah, The Electronic Intifada, June 4, 2003
With the twin summits in Sharm Al Sheikh and Aqaba underway, many believe that
the likelihood of a major breakthrough in the efforts to break the cycle of Israeli-Palestinian
violence and resuming serious talks towards a settlement are realistic. While
most are not oblivious to the usual Israeli manoeuvres, procrastination and obstructions,
which killed many similar previous attempts, they, this time, count on the commitment
of President George Bush to pursue his promise of settling this historic conflict
along the lines of his declared two-state vision, once and for all. Bush, they
argue, cannot afford to allow any failure on this front to erode his credibility
any further, particularly at this very critical juncture in his political life.
Neither would he go as far as holding all those summits, and reiterating his unwavering
resolve, if there were the slightest risk of any devastating anti-climax. With
so much unfinished business in Afghanistan, in the war of terror, which is reemerging
full force and hitting quite hard, and with desperate struggling to justify both
the cause and the effect of the war on Iraq, with daily loss of American life
and face, Bush will not allow Israeli Premier Ariel Sharon to deprive him of a
victory he needs and is bent on achieving, the optimistic view ardently reasons.
I fully support this line of thinking. I also believe that Sharon would not have
presented the roadmap to his Cabinet (though the resulting approval was damagingly
restricted and conditional) had it not been for intense and direct American pressure
on him to do that. Yet, and while I fully share what apparently looks as sound
reasoning, I do not, however, share any optimism as to the final outcome of this
effort, as I strongly believe, for reasons which will follow, that it is just
a matter of time before the whole scheme falls apart right in front of everybody's
wide open eyes.
The
Troops Are Afraid To Go Out At Night
By Robert Fisk, Dissident Voice, June 3, 2003
I was traveling into the Shia Muslim Iraqi city of Nasiriyah on Friday evening
when three American soldiers jumped in front of my car. "Stop the car, stop the
car!" one of them shouted, waving a pistol at the windscreen. I screamed at the
driver to stop. He hadn't seen them step into the road. Nor had I. Two other soldiers
approached from the rear, rifles pointed at our vehicle. I showed our identity
passes and the officer, wearing a floppy camouflage hat, was polite but short.
"You should have seen our checkpoint," he snapped, then added: "Have a good stay
in Nasiriyah but don't go out after dark. It's not safe." What he meant, I think,
was that it wasn't safe for American soldiers after dark. Hours later, I went
out in the streets of Nasiriyah for a chicken burger and the Iraqis who served
me in a run-down cafe couldn't have been friendlier. There were the usual apologies
for the dirt on the table and the just two months ago, a portrait of Saddam Hussein
must have been hanging. So what was going on? The "liberators" were already entering
the wilderness of occupation while our masters in London and Washington were still
braying about victory and courage and - here I quote Tony Blair on the same day,
addressing British troops 60 miles further south in Basra - of how they "went
on to try to make something of the country you liberated". Only a few hours earlier,
one of Ahmed Chalabi's militiamen in Nasiriyah had shouted at me that the Americans
there were "humiliating" the people, of how "they made a man crawl on all fours
in front of his friends just because they didn't obey their orders". There would
be a revolt if this went on, he warned. Now I don't know if his story was true,
and I have to say that every Shia I spoke to in Nasiriyah spoke warmly of the
British soldiers further south, but something has already gone terribly wrong.
Even the local museum guard who had earlier been travelling in my car had spoken
of oil as the only reason for the war. "One hundred days of Saddam were better
than a day of the Americans," he roared at me. I don't think that's true - the
Americans weren't slaughtering this man's fellow Shias by the tens of thousands
as Saddam did 12 years ago - but it's a new "truth" that is being written here.
Washington may hope that the charnel-house of corpses now being dug out of the
desert to the north will provide a posthumous new reason for the recent conflict.
"Now the truth can be told... " But we knew that truth a long time ago, after
George Bush Senior called on these same poor people to fight Saddam and then left
them to be butchered. "Saddam was a shame upon Iraq," one man told me as we stood
beside more than 400 skulls and bones in a school hall near Hillah. "But America
let them die." In reality, the lies that took us to war in Iraq are slowly being
stripped away from the men who sent the American and British armies to Mesopotamia.
Mr Blair could turn up in Basra this week with his sub-Churchillian rhetoric about
"valour", with his talk of "bloodshed and real casualties" and his sorrowful refrain
for the British soldiers "who aren't going back home". But who sent the British
to die in Iraq? If they were "real casualties", what happened to the weapons of
mass destruction that were so real when Mr Blair wanted to go to war but which
seem to be so unreal the moment the war is over?
The
truth, the whole truth and nothing but ...
By Jim Lobe, Asia Times, June 4, 2003
WASHINGTON - When all three major US newsweeklies - Time, Newsweek and US News
& World Report - run major features on the same day on possible government
lying, you can bet you have the makings of a major scandal. And when the two most
important outlets of neo-conservative opinion - The Weekly Standard and The Wall
Street Journal - come out on the same days with lead editorials spluttering outrage
about suggestions of government lying, you can bet that things are going to get
very hot as summer approaches in Washington. The controversy over whether the
administration of President George W Bush either exaggerated or lied about evidence
that it said it had about the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in
Iraq before the US-led invasion has mushroomed over the past week. "This is potentially
very serious," said one Congressional aide. "If it's shown we went to war because
of intelligence that was 'cooked' by the administration, heads will have to roll,
and not just little heads, big ones." The administration was already on the defensive
last week as the controversy took off in Europe, particularly in Britain where
Prime Minister Tony Blair found himself assailed from all directions for either
willfully exaggerating the intelligence himself or being "suckered", as his former
foreign minister Robin Cook called it this weekend, by Washington's neo-conservative
hawks, who started agitating for war even before the dust settled in lower Manhattan
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Matters took a turn for the worse
when the London Guardian reported the existence of a transcript, obviously leaked
from a senior British official, of an exchange at the Waldorf Hotel in New York
between US Secretary of State Colin Powell and British Foreign Minister Jack Straw
just before Powell's presentation of the evidence against Iraq before the United
Nations Security Council February 5.
Baghdad
Blogger
By Salam Pax, The Guardian, June 4, 2003
His irreverent web diary became an internet sensation during the war. Now, in
the first of his fortnightly Guardian columns, Salam Pax reports on life in the
Iraqi capital -- Vacancies: President needed - fluent in English, will have limited
powers only. Generous bonuses." This appeared on the first page of the Ahrar newspaper.
Another new weekly. Newspapers are coming out of our ears these days. There are
two questions which no one can answer: how many political parties are there now
in Iraq? And how many newspapers are printed weekly?" Most of these papers are
just two or four pages of party propaganda, no license or hassle. Just go print.
I am thinking of getting my own: "Pax News - all the rumours, all the time". On
the first page of the Ahrar paper you will also see a picture and a column by
the founder and chief editor. When the newspaper guy noticed how I was staring
at the picture he said: "Yes, it is the guy who sells Znood-al-sit [a popular
Iraqi sweet]". From pastry to news, wars do strange things to people. I got five
papers for 1,750 dinars, around $1.50, it felt like I was buying the famous bread
of bab-al-agha: hot, crispy and cheap. When the newspaper man saw how happy I
was with my papers he asked if I would like to take one for free. Newspaper heaven!
It turns out that no one is buying any copies of the paper published by the Iraqi
Communist workers party; he just wants to unload it on me. Look, I paid for the
Hawza paper so why not take the commie one gratis? Although the ministry of information
has been broken up and around 2,000 employees given the boot, the media industry,
if you can call it that, is doing very well. Beside all the papers we now have
a TV channel and radio; they are part of what our American minders have called
the Iraqi media network. My favourite TV show on it is an old Japanese cartoon
(here it is called Adnan wa Lina). It is about what happens after a third world
war when chaos reigns the earth. Bad choice for kids' programming if you ask me.
Some cities have their own local stations and there are two Kurdish TV channels.
But the BBC World Service killed in one move a favourite Iraqi pastime: searching
for perfect reception. The BBC Arabic service started broadcasting on FM here
and it is just not the same when you don't hear the static. The staff of the ministry
of information is being given $50 as a final payment these days: lots of angry
shouting and pointing at al-Jazeera cameras. Other civil workers had better luck
- the people at the electricity works got paid by the new salary scheme suggested
by the Bremer administration (the range is from 100,000 to 500,000 dinars, $100-$500:
the people at the lower end got a raise and the people at the top got the cream
taken off their pie) and as if by magic the electricity workers try a bit harder
and the situation gets better.
Israel's
Tripartite Moral Dilemma
By Baha Abushaqra, Palestine Chronicle, June 4, 2003
"If the two parties transcend their ethno-centric nationalistic aspirations, they
could do just as well sharing all of Palestine and not just Jerusalem .." -- At
a time when the prospects for peace in the Holy Land seem to have suddenly acquired
impetus (consider the Quartet-backed roadmap peace plan, for example), especially
seen in light of Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's recent profession that
the "occupation is bad for everyone" (slightly paraphrased), the "contentious"
issues characterizing the consistent fiascoes of successive peace initiatives
are resurfacing, again. Since these "contentious" issues are a direct result of
Israel's refusal to heed international law, they amount to a one-sided gestalt
of moral dilemmas for the Jewish State. The first of these dilemmas is the settlements
in the West Bank and Gaza (naturally non-contiguous regions, further disharmonized
with Jewish colonies, suggested for the future state of Palestine). Should secular
Israel abandon patriarchal "Judea and Samaria"? The ideas is that if, at least,
most of these Jewish settlements were "de-Judaized," Palestinians would attain
a quasi-coherent state. Contrary to what many people have been conditioned to
believe, however, the settlements in themselves were never the problem. The Palestinian
Authority has repeatedly said that the Jews of the settlements can remain in the
future Palestine and be given Palestinian citizenship. The real dilemma is whether
Jews are willing to concede Jewish hegemony over the territories. The second dilemma
is the right of return, guaranteed for Palestinians under international law and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The obfuscation happens when the dilemma
is posed in the context of the legitimacy of Israel's "right to exist." For example,
by arguing that Israel has a right to exist ("as a Jewish state" is automatically
implied). It is then purported as a case of one people's right to exist should
not override another's, thus, mischaracterizing the essence of the dilemma, which
is a moral one: should a Jewish state surmount international law and human rights?
The
Israeli Taboo… 55 Years On
By Isabelle Humphries, Islam Online, May 15, 2003
A just resolution can only be achieved by addressing 1948. -- The Israeli “left”
have long been talking and arguing over the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
of 1967. More controversial amongst so-called “peaceniks” is the future
of the city of Jerusalem . But the ultimate taboo is to talk about the occupation
and dispossession of the Palestinians in 1948. Discussing Jewish action in 1948
is naturally treacherous within mainstream Israeli society, but is even off limits
to the Israeli “peace” movement. While Israeli recognition of the
injustice of the continuing occupation of 1967 is essential, a genuine just resolution
will never begin to emerge until Jewish-Israelis address the issue of 1948. I
have lived for close to three years in Nazareth , the largest Palestinian city
remaining inside the 1948 borders. Approximately a third of the community lost
homes and land in 1948 and became refugees in Nazareth . Even if the occupation
of the West Bank and Gaza ended tomorrow, the injustice committed against Nazareth
refugees, just as for their brothers and sisters in Lebanon , would not be addressed.
In recent weeks, the case of Teddy Katz, Israeli research student at Haifa University
, has once more surfaced in the news. Katz’ academic research provided evidence
of a 1948 massacre in the Palestinian village of Tantura , in the northern coastal
region, by the Israeli Alexandroni Brigade. Despite the academic rigor of his
thesis, senior academics at Haifa University decided that even the demanded “revised”
version of his thesis would be disqualified. The Katz case would never have attracted
so much attention to the massacre in Tantura if it was not for the lengths that
the Israelis authorities have gone to suppress the research. Professors who have
supported Katz, notably Dr. Ilan Pappe, have seen their jobs threatened over the
issue of challenging mainstream Israeli myths of 1948. “In the present atmosphere
of fear and conformity in the Israeli academic community it is very easy to elicit
even a dozen negative reports of any work, especially by students, which are critical
of Zionism or Israel ” writes Pappe. The Katz case has demonstrated the
level of denial, and taboo nature of discussing the Nakba (1948 war) within Israeli
society.
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