Unilateral redeployment did not lose in these elections
By Yossi Alpher, MIFTAH, February 11, 2003
The Israeli elections of January 28 constituted a focal point for two significant unilateral initiatives, one Arab, one Israeli. Ostensibly, both failed. In fact, at least on the Israeli side, the elections actually provided grounds for guarded optimism. The Arab initiative was an attempt by Egypt to bring about a unilateral Palestinian ceasefire and then to seek Israeli reciprocation. Three months of intermittent talks in Cairo that involved up to 12 diverse Palestinian organizations ended in disarray on Israeli election day. In the final analysis, Hamas rejected a one-sided ceasefire, and refused to end anti-Israel violence in the West Bank and Gaza. Heavy Palestinian losses caused by Israeli military actions further soured the atmosphere. The Cairo talks are scheduled to be renewed later this month. Conceivably contacts with Palestinian leaders initiated by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon may contribute to a limited success. The chances are slim, but the Cairo talks have highlighted the strong desire of a wide variety of Palestinian leaders, local and national, to take matters into their own hands and end the violence.

Without mutuality, one misses the mark
By Ghassan Khatib, MIFTAH, February 11, 2003
The single common denominator between the unilateral approaches cropping up among Palestinians and Israelis is their demonstration of the failure of mutuality, which is the normal way for any two parties to solve disputes. For Palestinians, this go-it-alone attitude is an expression of frustration. But Israelis acting unilaterally, on the other hand, seem to be trying to force their negotiating position down the Palestinians' throats. Some Israelis have diverted efforts towards a compromise into thinking alone, deciding alone and then trying to implement that vision entirely single-handedly. The problem with the Israeli unilateral approach is that when the stronger party tries to impose a solution or arrangements that take into consideration only its own needs and requirements, this almost always comes at the expense of the needs of the weaker Palestinian side. In the practical sense, it might make Israelis feel less vulnerable to construct a wall or withdraw from some of the occupied territories (notably not all) but there is no reason to believe that this lessened fear will bring Israelis and Palestinians closer to the final, comprehensive and lasting peace that the majority of our publics crave. Indeed, by further isolating Palestinians from Israelis, the Israeli public can be expected to grow less understanding of the Palestinian bottom line.

Ballots for bullets
By Ahmed Abdel-Halim, Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, February 6 - 12, 2003
The Israeli elections and the likely war with Iraq are heralds of far-reaching geo-political changes --The recent Israeli elections were characterised by three factors: electoral apathy since the results were known in advance; how the inability of either side to galvanise the electorate worked to the advantage of the tried and tested Sharon; and prevailing anxiety in Israel over policy and security together with belief in Sharon as the man with the solutions. This was accompanied by changes on the international scene, particularly in the US where the administration leans to the extreme right, that reflected upon the Israeli electorate, which cast Sharon in the mould of US President George Bush. This was reinforced by the concord between US and Israeli desires to end remaining conflicts to their satisfaction. The US seeks to complete its reshaping of the Middle East according to its vision and in its interest, while Israel seeks to settle outstanding issues connected with the Palestinians and begin the settlement of the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict in conformity with US thinking. In this context, Israeli voters having cast their ballots in the Jewish state's 16th general elections proved that Ariel Sharon, who became prime minister for the first time two years ago, remains their leader of choice for the coming period. More significantly, the Likud Party which he leads has become the sole power holding sway over Israeli politics after 25 years of two-party politics and alternation of rule. Likud went into the elections on a clear platform and with a leader who spoke the language of strength. Sharon's army career was marked by a willingness to take risks and an acceptance of human casualties in the pursuit of important goals. This might serve to explain why loss of life within Israeli society has reached unprecedented levels during Sharon's period in office. Sharon was able to convince his supporters that achieving significant Israeli objectives to secure the place of the Jewish state in the region necessitated Israeli sacrifices.

Strategies of statehood
By Mustafa El-Barghouti, Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, February 6 - 12, 2003
The objective of peace is a democratic Palestinian state. But how can that happen now? -- The most dangerous thing that could happen to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict today would be for Israel to take the initiative and maintain it. It did just that when it drew Palestinians into the Oslo Accords, stopping the first Intifada short before it could produce decisive political achievements. With military, political and media campaigns waged against the Palestinian people, its institutions, and its leadership, Israel is seeking to exhaust Palestinians, pushing them once more into unilaterally declaring an end to hostilities while Israel continues expanding settlements and strengthening its system of apartheid. Israel is currently alternating calls for peace with direct pressure to force Palestinians to submit. Given the international situation that emerged after 11 September, the weakness of the Arab position and Israel's military superiority, the only thing that can stop Israeli attempts to secure the upper hand is a clear Palestinian strategy that seeks to defend the rights of the Palestinian people and turn the great sacrifices made in this Intifada into tangible political gains. Palestinians are perhaps too busy thinking about what others want from us and about the plans being drawn up for us: the time has come, nonetheless, to clearly define what we ourselves want and how to get it. This means that we must refocus our thoughts and energies into the realm of the proactive rather than merely reacting to events.

An Iron Triangle: Raytheon-Israel-Congress
By Joshua Ruebner, CounterPunch, February 11, 2003
"To qualify for self-determination, a people must show some kind of national identity....What political organizations, social institutions, literature, art, religion, or private correspondence express any ties between the Palestinian people to the Land of Israel?" --Adam Cherrill, Manager of Business Development, Raytheon Business Systems, November 18, 2002 -- I travel around this country speaking about the need for the United States to support a balanced foreign policy toward the Israel-Palestine conflict. At these events, inevitably I encounter staunch defenders of Israel's military occupation of Palestine who refuse to question the morality of Israel's policy of denying another people their fundamental human rights to live in freedom and dignity. It is difficult to become anesthetized to the shock of encountering people who view Palestinians as being less deserving of universally recognized human rights than others. Normally, I just take these types of statements to be representative of a hate-filled fringe, refute them, and move on. However, the remarks above, delivered in response to an address I gave at the University of Arizona, were different. Adam Cherrill is not a member of a shadowy, millennial cult busily preparing for the building of the Third Temple in Jerusalem. If he were, then it would be easy enough to dismiss what he had to say. No, Cherrill is a person of considerable clout-the program manager for Raytheon's joint marketing of the Black Sparrow ballistic target missile with the Israeli weapons manufacturer Rafael. I wondered why would Raytheon-one of the largest U.S. weapons makers, employing 77,500 people worldwide and generating $16.9 billion in revenues in 2001-place an advocate of the expansionist notion of "Greater Israel" in such a prominent position in the U.S.-Israeli military relationship? What does it say for U.S. foreign policy to have an American responsible for marketing Israeli missiles who believes that "Israel has a far stronger claim to Judea and Samaria, which is considered the West Bank, than the Arabs"?

The myth of the state and the reality of the annexation
By Amira Hass, Ha'aretz, February 12, 2003
The conventional wisdom in Israel is that in 2000, the Palestinians rejected the "generous" Israeli offer for a permanent solution and its readiness for a Palestinian state, and then the Palestinians initiated the outbreak of the bloody conflict. According to that same belief, many Israelis continue to support the establishment of a Palestinian state, even now - but not before the Palestinians stop the terrorism. That belief plays an important role in the media and political propaganda effort made by Israel - meaning the IDF - in the West Bank and Gaza, along the lines of: the Palestinians started it, so they can suffer. How absurd. During the decade of negotiations, which began in 1991 with the Madrid Conference, the idea of a "Palestinian state" as a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict won ever-increasing numbers of supporters in Israel, and at the very least became a legitimate issue for discussion in the political arena, as it never had been before. But at the same time, the Palestinian lands earmarked for that state shrank, and were carved up and divided. It's all been documented and reported. But like now, back then, most Israelis never went to the territories. Therefore everything that took place was abstract. A bypass road? Land expropriations? Settlement expansion? Uprooted trees? Closure? What's all that compared to talk of Israeli readiness for concessions in some undefined future. Thus the myths became tangible and real - the myth of concessions like the myth of support for a Palestinian state. And those myths continue to feed the nearly unshakable support for the Israeli military policy in the territories.